Re-send the one-time code for an in-progress email two-factor challenge.
Post the challenge token from the original POST /api/v1/tokens response:
{ "challenge_token": "eyJ..." }
A fresh code is emailed and a new challenge is returned (superseding
the previous one), in the same shape as the 202 from
POST /api/v1/tokens minus two_factor_required. Only Email
challenges can be resent — there is nothing to resend for Totp
(the authenticator app generates codes locally), so a Totp
challenge returns 400 with a body of not_supported. Rate limited
to 3 requests per minute (429).
Query Parameters
Response
A new code was sent; the replacement challenge is returned.
Returned when a login cannot complete with a password alone because the user has two-factor authentication enabled. Carries the opaque challenge token that must be echoed back to POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor (or the recovery / resend / switch-mechanism endpoints) along with enough metadata for a client to render the verification step without a second round-trip. The property names are snake_case to match the wire format of the other token endpoints (see TokenPayload).
Present and true on the 202 response from POST /api/v1/tokens when the user has at least one verified 2FA method. Absent on the resend / switch-mechanism responses, which only ever follow an already-issued login challenge.
Present and true instead of two_factor_required when the tenant forces 2FA but the user has not yet enrolled any method. In that case only challenge_token and expires_in are populated and the client must route the user through the mid-login enrollment endpoints (/api/v1/tokens/two-factor/enroll/...) before a token can be issued.
Short-lived signed JWT (audience outseta:2fa-challenge) that identifies this challenge. Echo it back verbatim to complete the login.
The mechanism this challenge was issued against: Email or Totp (authenticator app). For Email a code has already been sent to the user; for Totp the user reads the current code from their authenticator app and nothing is sent.
A masked view of where an emailed code was sent (e.g. b***@outseta.com), suitable for display. Empty when mechanism is Totp.
Seconds until the challenge expires (600). After this the challenge_token can no longer be verified and the login must restart.
Every verified mechanism enrolled for this user (excluding recovery codes), e.g. ["Totp", "Email"]. A client can offer a "use a different method" option for any value other than the current mechanism via POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor/switch-mechanism.
true when the user has a batch of recovery codes on file, in which case POST /api/v1/tokens/two-factor/recovery can be used as a fallback if they cannot produce a primary code.